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The Myth of the Optional War: Why States Are Required to Wage the 
Wars they are Permitted to Wage 
 
 
 Within just war theory, much has been written on the question of when states 
are morally permitted to wage war.  Much less is written on the question of when 
states are morally required to wage war.  In the literature that does exist, the 
predominant view is that while there are wars that states are required to wage and, of 
course, many wars states are prohibited from waging, there is also a middle category: 
wars that states are permitted but not required to wage.1  These are what we may call 
“optional wars”.  If a war is optional, a state enjoys moral discretion over whether or 
not to wage it. 
 This article argues that there are no optional wars.  States are either required to 
wage war or prohibited from doing so. The article considers two arguments for 
optional war.  The first relates to wars of humanitarian intervention.  It holds that a 
humanitarian war can be so costly for the soldiers and taxpayers of the intervening 
state, that the state is not required to wage the war, although it may remain permitted 
to do so.  The second relates to wars of national self-defence.  It holds that states have 
the right to defend themselves but that this right is, at least sometimes, discretionary: 
                                                 
 I presented this article to Edinburgh University’s Political Theory Research Group and received 
helpful feedback. I am also grateful to Alfred Archer, Daniel Butt, Philip Cook, Christina Dineen, 
Elizabeth Cripps, Alan Oberman, David Rodin and Victor Tadros for their suggestions on various 
drafts.  The insightful comments of the two reviewers transformed the article for the better.  Particular 
thanks are owed to Jonathan Parry, James Stazicker and Patrick Tomlin for multiple conversations and 
invaluable advice. 
1 See C.A.J. Coady, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, (Washington: United States Institute for 
Peace, 2002), p. 25; David Miller, “The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights,” in Legitimacy, 
Justice and Public International Law, ed. Lukas H. Meyer, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009); Jeff McMahan, “Humanitarian Intervention, Consent and Proportionality,” in Ethics and 
Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover, ed. N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen and 
Jeff McMahan, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 55-63; Terry Nardin, “The Moral 
Basis of Humanitarian Intervention,” Ethics & International Affairs 16 (2002): 57-70, at p. 69; 
Fernando R. Tesón, “Eight Principles for Humanitarian Intervention,” Journal of Military Ethics 5 
(2006): 93-113, at pp. 97-98; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with 
Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic Books, 2000) pxiii, p70; Noam J. Zohar, “Can a War be 
Morally ‘Optional’?,” Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996): 229-241.  
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states may choose whether or not to exercise it.  The first of these arguments is the 
more popular.  Humanitarian intervention, not national self-defence, is the standard 
example of optional war.  Yet we shall find that the second argument, while 
ultimately unsuccessful, is actually the more plausible of the two.   
 Both arguments employ what Michael Walzer has referred to as the “domestic 
analogy”: an analogy between the ethics of war and the ethics of violence undertaken 
by ordinary individuals.2  Individuals are not always required to use force when they 
are permitted to do so.  If the analogy held, the idea of the optional war would be 
compelling.  But the analogy does not hold.  The differences between states and 
individuals are such that states lack the moral freedom individuals possess.  The 
domestic analogy has already attracted significant criticism.  A number of 
philosophers have criticised its use to derive conclusions as to when war is 
permissible.3   This article demonstrates that the domestic analogy can be equally 
misleading when applied to the question of when war is required. 
 Before embarking, two clarifications.  First, our focus in this article is on wars 
waged by states.  We are not concerned with wars waged by militias or other non-
state actors.  Second, the idea we are interested in is the idea that wars can be optional 
under real world conditions: conditions that either currently obtain or could 
realistically come to obtain.  Whether wars could be optional in some highly artificial 
scenario, such as one in which state decisions result from a perfect consensus amongst 
citizens, we will not investigate.  Proponents of optional war argue that under real 
                                                 
2 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 58. 
3 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), pp. 71-74; Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), pp. 132-139, 169-173; Jeff McMahan, “What Rights Can be Defended by Means of 
War?,” in The Morality of Defensive War, ed. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014); David Rodin, War and Self-Defense, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 141-
162. 
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world conditions, states can wage wars they are not required to wage.  That is the idea 
I seek to critique. 
 Sections 1 to 3 address the argument that wars of humanitarian intervention 
can be optional because the costs can exceed that which soldiers and taxpayers are 
obliged to bear.  Section 1 presents this argument.  Section 2 critiques it, 
demonstrating that cost can render a war impermissible, but not optional.  Section 3 
shows how considerations of choice, consent and political obligation cannot rescue 
the idea of optional intervention.  Sections 4 and 5 address the argument that the right 
to national self-defence is sometimes discretionary.  Section 4 shows that national 
self-defence is morally required when justified as a means to defend the rights of 
individual citizens or uphold the norm of non-aggression.  Section 5 considers the 
idea that national self-defence could be justified to defend the state as a community.  
It concedes that if there were cases in which this community justification was the sole 
justification for war, war could be optional, but finds strong reason to doubt that any 
such cases arise. 
 
1. Humanitarian Wars 
Wars of humanitarian intervention require a weighty justification.  One reason 
for this is that they are a form of intervention.  It is plausible to think that states 
should not normally intervene in the affairs of other states.  A second reason is that 
wars of humanitarian intervention are a form of war.  War involves killing and killing 
should never be engaged in for a trivial cause.   
 That wars of humanitarian intervention require a weighty justification is 
widely recognised.  There is widespread agreement that humanitarian intervention is 
only justified in response to a profound injustice.  On some accounts, intervention is 
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only justified against regimes that persistently commit widespread breaches of basic 
human rights, such as the human rights to life, freedom from torture and freedom 
from arbitrary imprisonment.4   Others find even this too permissive. Walzer, for 
instance, argues that intervention is only justified to prevent abuse so extreme that it is 
comparable to the enslavement or massacre of an entire population.5   
  Since wars of humanitarian intervention require weighty justification, we 
already have good prima facie reason to think that states are required to wage the 
humanitarian wars they are permitted to wage.6  Any cause that is so important that it 
is worth intervening and killing for would seem to be a cause that states are required 
to support.  A war that is permissible, moreover, will fulfil standard just war 
conditions: proportionality, last resort, reasonable chance of success etc.  Why then 
would a state not be required to wage a permissible humanitarian war? 
 There is a standard response to this question: the costs of a humanitarian war 
can be so high that the state is not required to wage it.  There are at least two types of 
cost: the costs suffered by soldiers (deaths, injuries etc.) and the financial costs borne 
by taxpayers.  The phrase “blood and treasure” captures both.  The thought is that 
there is a limit to the sacrifice that can be expected of states even for the sake of those 
in dire need.  To demand that states wage war whenever war stands to prevent a 
profound injustice is to demand too much.7   
                                                 
4 See for instance David Luban, “Just War and Human Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 
(2007): 160-181, at pp. 173-176; James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and The Responsibility To 
Protect: Who Should Intervene?, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 20-24; Fernando R 
Tesón, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. JL Holzgrefe and Robert O Keohane, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 96-97. 
5 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 101-108. 
6  Kok-Chor Tan, “The Duty to Protect,” in Nomos XLVIIi: Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Terry 
Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, (New York: New York University Press, 2006), pp. 90-91. 
7 McMahan, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 56; Miller, “The Responsibility,” pp. 41-44; Nardin, “The 
Moral Basis”, at p. 69; Tesón, “Eight Principles”, at p. 97; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. xiii; 
Zohar, “Can a War”, at pp. 236-239. 
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 To see the force of this argument, consider analogous examples involving 
individuals.  Suppose you are witnessing a brutal assault.  You could intervene, but 
you risk being seriously injured.  Most people would say that you have no obligation 
to intervene.  Or suppose that by donating every dollar you can spare, you can save 
lives in developing countries.  Again, most would say you have no obligation to bear 
this cost.  Morality, on this view, leaves people some space within which they can 
pursue their own interests, even when others are in dire need.  
 In these examples people have no obligation to assist others in dire need 
because the costs are too high.  But note that if the costs were not too high, there 
would be a humanitarian obligation to assist.8  If you could stop an assault or provide 
life saving aid at an acceptable cost, you should do so.  Similarly, if states could 
intervene to protect people against some profound injustice without imposing overly 
burdensome costs upon soldiers and taxpayers, they would be morally required to do 
so.9   
 There is, of course, significant scope for disagreement as to what constitutes 
an acceptable or overly burdensome cost.  Different accounts of morality yield 
different conclusions, some more demanding, some less so.  This article takes no part 
in that debate.  It follows proponents of the idea of the optional war in assuming that 
there is some limit to the cost that people are obliged to bear for the sake of those in 
need.  It offers no opinion as to where the limit lies.   
 One further complication worth noting is that there are in fact two ways to fill 
out the idea of an optional war of humanitarian intervention (henceforth “optional 
                                                 
8 A humanitarian obligation requires its bearer to provide assistance because others are in need.  As we 
shall see, it is important to distinguish humanitarian from political obligations.  Political obligations 
require citizens to obey decisions taken by their state’s decision makers.  I return to this distinction in 
section 3. 
9 None of the proponents of the idea of optional intervention deny this point and some endorse it.  See, 
for instance, McMahan, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 57; Tesón, “Eight Principles”, at p. 98. 
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intervention”).  One straightforward view is that when a state is permitted but not 
required to intervene, it has no duty of any kind to do so.  If it wages a humanitarian 
war, its act is supererogatory.10  On a second view, there is a duty to intervene but the 
duty is “imperfect”.  It falls upon all states collectively, leaving each state free to 
decide whether or not to fulfil it.11  There are important differences between these two 
views of optional intervention, but they need not detain us.   Both views claim that a 
particular state can be permitted but not required to wage a humanitarian war. 
 We have now explained one important element of the idea of optional 
intervention: states are not always required to wage permissible humanitarian wars, 
since sometimes the costs are overly burdensome to soldiers and taxpayers.  But the 
question now arises: why should we regard a war as permissible if it imposes overly 
burdensome costs?  Surely, if a war imposes overly burdensome costs it is, for this 
reason, impermissible?  The most plausible answer to this question is that states are 
free to voluntarily assume costs they are not required to bear.12   Here again the 
analogy with ordinary individuals illuminates the argument.  You may be under no 
obligation to tackle a dangerous assailant, but you can if you wish.  You may not be 
required to donate every spare dollar, but you are still permitted to do so.  It is you, 
after all, who will bear the costs.  If the analogy worked, the idea of optional 
intervention would be compelling.  But the analogy fails. 
 
2.  The Cost Principle   
 Unlike individuals, states are composed of various subgroups.  Let us specify 
four: the government, voters, soldiers and taxpayers.  Typically, it is the government 
                                                 
10 Zohar, “Can a War”, at pp. 237-238. 
11 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. xiii. 
12  Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 180; McMahan, 
“Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 56. 
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that decides whether or not to wage war.  In democracies, voters might also be said to 
share in the decision, a possibility I return to below.  The government and (perhaps) 
voters are thus the decision makers.  Soldiers and taxpayers are the cost bearers.  
When a state wages a war, soldiers are forced to fight it and taxpayers to fund it.13   
 We can now clarify what it means to say that a state is permitted or required to 
wage war: it means that a state’s decision makers are permitted or required to decide 
to wage war.  What the state is permitted or required to do is thus ultimately a matter 
of what decision makers are permitted or required to decide.  Yet cost bearers are not 
irrelevant to these considerations.  When states wage war, it is cost bearers who are 
assigned the costs of waging it.  Decision makers are thus only permitted to decide to 
wage war when they can permissibly assign the costs to cost bearers.  
 If we now consider again the analogy with humanitarian acts of individuals, 
we can see how misleading it is.  The individuals in the assault and aid examples bear 
the costs of their decisions themselves.  When decision makers decide to wage 
humanitarian wars, by contrast, they impose the costs on soldiers and taxpayers.  The 
correct analogy then is not with humanitarian acts performed by individuals but with 
laws requiring their performance.  We should think not of an individual choosing to 
intervene in an assault but Good Samaritan laws requiring them to intervene.  We 
should think not of people choosing to contribute to development aid but governments 
taxing people for this purpose. 
 In all such cases, there must be a limit to the costs that decision makers can 
forcibly impose upon cost bearers (a “limit to imposition”) as well as a limit to the 
costs that cost bearers are obligated to bear (a “limit to obligation”).  A Good 
                                                 
13 While soldiers are forced to fight in wars on pain of court martial, they may, of course, have joined 
the military voluntarily.  I consider the relevance of this point below. 
  8 
Samaritan law that required people to run dangerous risks would be widely regarded 
as unjust.  So would a tax that required taxpayers to surrender every spare dollar to 
fund development aid.  But where, precisely, does this limit to imposition lie?   
 The principle I propose is this: those in power should not force people to 
render humanitarian assistance to those in dire need if the costs exceed that which 
people have a humanitarian obligation to bear.14  Let us call this the “Cost Principle”.  
The Cost Principle effectively holds that the limit to imposition is no higher than the 
limit to obligation.  If the cost of providing assistance is so large that cost bearers 
have no humanitarian obligation to bear it, decision makers should not foist it upon 
them.   
 What reason is there for believing that the two limits are related in this way?  
One clue comes from how we think about the above cases.  Consider Good Samaritan 
laws.  Those who defend these laws argue that they enforce people’s humanitarian 
obligations to intervene to assist those in need when the risks are minor.15  No one 
proposes, however, that people be forced to run risks so grave that they have no 
humanitarian obligation to bear them.  On the contrary, some scholars question the 
permissibility of forcing people to intervene even when people are clearly obliged to 
                                                 
14 I am not the first to elaborate a principle of this kind.  See Larry A. Alexander, “Scheffler on the 
Independence of Agent-Centered Prerogatives from Agent-Centered Restrictions,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 84 (1987): 277-283, at pp. 278-279; Bashshar Haydar, “Forced Supererogation and 
Deontological Restrictions,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2002): 445-454; Liam Murphy, 
“Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue,” Georgetown Law Journal 89 (2000): 
605-666, at pp. 647-648; R. H. Myers, “Prerogatives and Restrictions from the Cooperative Point of 
View,” Ethics 105 (1994): 128-152, at pp. 144-147; Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1971): 47-66, at pp. 63-64.  Also see the Beitz and Murphy references 
in n. 18 below. 
15 Cécile Fabre, “Good Samaritanism: A Matter of Justice,” Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy 5 (2002): 128-144, at p. 133; Joel Feinberg, “The Moral and Legal Responsibility 
of the Bad Samaritan,” Criminal Justice Ethics 3 (1984): 56-69, at pp. 57-64; John Kleinig, “Good 
Samaritanism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 5 (1976): 382-407, at p. 384. 
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do so.16  The debate, in other words, is over whether the costs that morality obliges 
people to bear can permissibly be imposed by law, not whether the law can impose 
additional costs.  Next consider development aid.  Those defending aid take pains to 
argue that taxpayers are obliged to fund it.17  The fact that aid can achieve good 
results is not, in itself, thought sufficient justification.  Philosophers recognise that 
governments should not force taxpayers to give more in aid than taxpayers are obliged 
to give.18 
 There is a deeper argument for the Cost Principle, however.  Recall that on the 
conception of morality assumed by proponents of optional war, it is important that 
people are left a certain space to pursue their own interests.  It is this concern that sets 
the limit to obligation.  But if morality leaves a certain space for people to pursue 
their own interests, why would morality permit powerful third parties, such as the 
government, to intrude upon this space by forcing people to render additional 
assistance?  A morality that both leaves space for self-interest and permits intrusion 
upon that space by third parties makes little sense.  If it is as important as is claimed 
that people are left a space to pursue their own interests when confronted with the 
needs of others, then that space must set limits not only on what they are obliged to 
do, but also on what they can be forced to do.  The two limits are so related, in other 
                                                 
16 Joshua Dressler, “Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) about Bad Samaritan Laws Symposium,” 
Santa Clara Law Review 40 (1999): 971-990; H. M. Malm, “Liberalism, Bad Samaritan Law, and 
Legal Paternalism,” Ethics 106 (1995): 4-31. 
17  Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1972): 229-243, 
see esp. p. 240; Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social 
Responsibilities, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 154-168; Brian R. Opeskin, “The 
Moral Foundations of Foreign Aid,” World Development 24 (1996): 21-44. 
18 Charles R. Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 
591-600, at pp. 598-599; Liam B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 84. 
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words, because the concern that sets the limit to obligation applies equally when 
setting the limit to imposition.19   
 We can reach the same conclusion from the other direction.  Imagine that we 
have already determined the limit to imposition and we are now seeking to determine 
the limit to obligation.  Morality, we have determined, permits those in power to force 
people to provide humanitarian assistance at a certain level of cost.  Given this, why 
would morality not also directly require people to provide humanitarian assistance up 
to that level of cost?  The answer cannot be that that the level of cost is too high such 
that it threatens to deny people sufficient space to pursue their own interests.  For if 
that were the case, then morality would not have permitted those in power to impose 
these costs upon people.  Having permitted those in power to force people to provide 
humanitarian assistance at a certain level of cost, there would be no harm in directly 
requiring people to do so.  
 Having presented the Cost Principle, two clarifications.  First, the extent of 
people’s humanitarian obligations should not be identified with what they are obliged 
to provide in the absence of the state.  The state is a useful tool, able to solve 
collective action problems and reach needy people who could not otherwise be 
assisted.  Given the existence of this tool, people are likely to owe different 
obligations to those in need than they would owe in a state of nature.20  The Cost 
Principle should not then be taken to condemn states that force people to provide 
further assistance to that which they would be obliged to provide absent the state.  
People can be forced to provide further assistance as long the existence of the state 
has the effect of expanding their humanitarian obligations.  It is only when the state 
                                                 
19 Haydar, “Forced Supererogation and Deontological Restrictions”, at pp. 452-454. 
20 See Henry Shue, “Mediating Duties,” Ethics 98 (1988): 687-704. 
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seeks to impose costs that exceed these (appropriately expanded) humanitarian 
obligations that the Cost Principle condemns its behaviour. 
 Second, it is worth emphasising that the argument given for the Cost Principle 
is an argument against the imposition of overly burdensome costs.  The argument 
should not be taken to involve a more general opposition to forcing people to do what 
they are not morally obliged to do.   This point will become clear when we consider 
the question of whether any state activity is morally optional; a question I consider at 
the end of Section 3. 
 Let us note the implications of the Cost Principle for humanitarian 
intervention.  The cost argument for optional war holds that intervention is sometimes 
optional because the costs can exceed what soldiers and taxpayers have a 
humanitarian obligation to bear.  Applying the Cost Principle, it is clear that this 
argument cannot work.  States cannot permissibly wage humanitarian wars when the 
costs to cost bearers exceed their humanitarian obligations.  The primary example of 
an optional war given in the literature is nothing but an example of an impermissible 
war.21   
 
3. Choice, Consent and Political Obligation 
 There are, however, three ways a proponent of the idea of optional 
intervention might still seek to justify the assignment of costs to soldiers and 
taxpayers.  It might be argued that cost bearers (1) chose to wage war, (2) consented 
to bear costs or (3) owe a non-consent-based political obligation to bear the costs.  Let 
us explore each possibility in turn. 
                                                 
21  For related thoughts see James Pattison, “Whose Responsibility to Protect? The Duties of 
Humanitarian Intervention,” Journal of Military Ethics 7 (2008): 262-283, at p. 270. 
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 To the extent that cost bearers have themselves chosen to wage war, they 
would seem unable to complain against bearing the costs.  Soldiers and taxpayers are 
also voters.  In a democracy, voters choose the government through competitive 
elections.  When a government decides to wage war, voters might thus be said to 
share in the decision to wage war.  This claim seems most plausible if the decision to 
wage war is taken as a result of an election: the pro-war party having won the vote.22  
 The problem with this argument is that even when some cost bearers can be 
said to share in the decision to wage war, not all can.  It is in the nature of democracy 
that people disagree.  Even if a majority votes in favour of war, this leaves a minority 
who oppose it.  This outvoted minority will be asked to bear the costs as well.  
Decisions makers must then justify forcing dissenting soldiers and taxpayers to bear 
the costs of a war they oppose.  It cannot be said that the decision to wage war was 
their own, for that is not so.23 
  Let us consider the second strategy: perhaps cost bearers can be said to have 
consented to bear the costs of a decision to wage war whether or not the decision is 
their own.  This argument is most plausible in the case of soldiers.  Soldiers in a 
professional military have chosen soldiering as their career.  That choice might be 
said to involve consenting to the costs of fighting wars.24  It is difficult to see how the 
argument could be made for taxpayers.  People do not typically choose to be taxed.  
                                                 
22 The argument is much less plausible when, as is standardly the case, the decision to wage war is 
taken outside of an election.  If voters did not know at the time of the election that the party they were 
voting for would later decide to wage war, it seems implausible to claim that the decision to wage war 
was taken by voters.   
23 It might still be argued that the minority has a duty to respect the outcome of the democratic process.  
I consider this argument below. 
24 Tesón, “The Liberal Case,” p. 127.  As Tesón notes, however, the characterisation of soldiers as 
consenting volunteers may be challenged.  It is often people from deprived backgrounds that enlist in 
the military.  The pressures they face might be said to render their decision to enlist less than voluntary.  
Tesón is able to respond to this objection only by appeal to a libertarian conception of consent, under 
which socio-economic conditions are deemed irrelevant.  Those who reject this libertarian conception 
of consent have reason to question the consent argument even in the case of soldiers.   
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But let us imagine, if only for the sake of argument, a case in which a war is funded 
not by general taxation but by some voluntary scheme: donations from pro-war 
citizens, perhaps, or a “voluntary tax” such as a state lottery. 
 If decision makers could order a humanitarian war that prevents a profound 
injustice without violating standard just war conditions, using the resources of 
consenting adults, then, arguably, they would be permitted to do so.25  But then if they 
were permitted to order such a war, why would they not be required to do so?  Recall 
that the argument for optional intervention rested on the concern that humanitarian 
war can impose overly burdensome costs upon soldiers and taxpayers.  But here we 
are imagining a case in which that concern has been addressed: the costs are not 
merely imposed; they have been consented to.  Once the concern is removed, the 
argument for optional intervention collapses.  For if cost bearers have consented and 
their consent renders intervention permissible, then decision makers have no 
justification for refraining from ordering the intervention that, ex hypothesi, stands to 
protect people from a profound injustice. 
 For an analogy, consider the moral duty states have to provide police 
protection from assault.  We have suggested that states should not force people to run 
significant risks to tackle assailants.  However, some people are willing to volunteer 
for the police and assume the significant risks involved.   Given this, it would seem 
wrong for the state not to maintain a police force and use it accordingly.  A state that 
leaves its citizens without police protection from assault would fail in its obligations.  
When the state can permissibly make use of volunteers to assist people in dire need, 
                                                 
25 Although some might object, on paternalistic grounds, that when the costs are particularly high, it 
can be wrong to utilize even consenting adults for humanitarian ends.  If so, consent cannot always 
justify humanitarian war.  To examine the consent argument further, I set this objection aside.  
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the state is required to do so.  This principle applies in the case of police protection 
from assault; it also applies to humanitarian intervention. 
 Let us turn to the third approach.  Perhaps citizens can be said to owe a 
political obligation to bear the costs of a government decision even if the decision is 
not their own and they have not consented to bear the costs.  The idea that people can 
owe a political obligation in the absence of consent is controversial but not 
implausible.  Consider, for instance, the argument that democratic principles can 
require people to obey the law.  If democracy is a fair way to make decisions it may 
be wrong for an outvoted minority to refuse to accept the result. 26   Indeed, the 
political obligation that people have to obey democratically made decisions may be so 
weighty that it might require them to bear costs surpassing that which they have a 
humanitarian obligation to bear. 
   The implication of this argument for humanitarian wars is that dissenting 
citizens may owe a political obligation to bear the costs of a war, even though the 
costs exceed that which they have a humanitarian obligation to bear.  Let us suppose 
this is the case.  Still the decision to wage war would be wrong because of the high 
costs involved.  To see this, note first that the idea that citizens have a political 
obligation to obey a decision does not entail that the decision was morally 
permissible.  This is something that proponents of political obligation themselves 
insist upon.  A decision can be wrong, they argue, and still citizens can be obligated to 
obey.  Thus to take the example of the democratic argument for political obligation, 
the argument does not hold that elections always yield the right result, but that an 
outvoted minority should ordinarily respect the result even if it is morally wrong.  
                                                 
26 Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973). 
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One cannot then show that a decision is morally permissible merely because it was 
arrived at democratically.  A state can be democratic and act wrongly.27  
   There is no reason then to abandon the Cost Principle: those in power should 
not force people to provide humanitarian assistance if the costs exceed that which 
people have a humanitarian obligation to bear.  Once decision makers have made 
their decision, cost bearers may have a political obligation to comply, but that does 
not mean that it was permissible for decision makers, when making their decision, to 
opt to impose such high costs.  The idea that cost bearers owe a political obligation to 
support an intervention cannot then rescue decision makers from the charge of having 
wrongfully imposed overly burdensome costs. 
 I have so far invoked the Cost Principle in rejecting the argument from 
political obligation.  There is, however, at least one approach to political obligation 
that is itself incompatible with the idea of optional war.  According to Joseph Raz’s 
influential “service conception” of authority, one can be obliged to obey an authority 
because, and to the extent that, “conformity with it improves one's conformity with 
reason”.28  Raz’s thought is that sometimes others are better placed to determine what 
we should do than we are ourselves.  These others might make mistakes, but as long 
as they are less prone to making mistakes than we are, we have reason to obey them. 
 Could Raz’s account of authority apply to the decision to wage war?  It could 
if (a) there is a right answer as to whether the citizens of a state should wage a war 
and (b) citizens would do better in acting in accordance with that answer by obeying 
                                                 
27 The idea that citizens can have a political obligation to respect a wrong decision has a long history; it 
is the subject of Plato’s Crito.  For modern defenses see Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, pp. 3, 
250-251; Singer, Democracy and Disobedience, pp. 71-72; Michael Walzer, “Philosophy and 
Democracy,” in Philosophy and Democracy: An Anthology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
p. 272.  David Estlund defends it in relation to war in “On Following Orders in an Unjust War,” 
Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2007): 213-234. 
28 Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 139.  
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the state’s decision makers than by acting on their own judgment.29  It is debatable 
how often these conditions are fulfilled.30  But, the crucial point for our purposes is 
that, were these conditions fulfilled, decision makers would not be morally free to 
decide whether or not to wage war.  If there is a right answer as to what people should 
do in a particular case, decision makers must aid their citizens to comply with that 
right answer.  On the Razian account, this is why decision makers have authority.  
Decision makers who knowingly refrain from pursuing the “optimific action” (to use 
Raz’s phrase) undermine the case for their own authority.31   
 Now, as it happens, it seems questionable that in the kind of case we are 
interested in – those involving supererogatory acts of humanitarian assistance – there 
is a right answer as to what people should do.  Imagine you could save someone’s life 
at a cost so grave you have no obligation to bear it.  Should you?  It seems impossible 
for anyone else to say.  Others can advise you of the risks.  But if you know the risks 
and you have no obligation to act either way, then the decision is yours alone.  If this 
is so, there is no Razian argument for state authority on such matters.  Citizens must 
be left to make the relevant decisions themselves.     
 Thus if we accept Raz’s account of authority, we have an additional argument 
against optional war.  For either there is an answer as to what people should do, in 
which case a state’s decision makers may have authority but they must pursue that 
right answer, or there is no right answer, in which case there is no grounds for 
empowering decision makers on the issue.  In neither case are decision makers 
morally free to decide as they please.  
                                                 
29 For an application of Raz’s account of authority to just war theory see Jonathan Parry, “Authority 
and Harm in War”, PhD Thesis (University of Sheffield, 2014).    
30 Compare Estlund, “On Following Orders”; Jeff Mcmahan, Killing in War, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2009), pp. 66-70. 
31 Joseph Raz, “Liberty and Trust,” in Natural Law, Liberty and Morality, ed. Robert P. George, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 119. 
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 There is one last issue to be addressed.  While this article claims there are no 
optional wars, someone might suggest that the implication of my argument is far more 
radical to the extent that it denies the possibility of morally optional state activity of 
any kind.  After all, whenever a state undertakes projects, it forces taxpayers to fund 
them.  If my argument were interpreted as supporting the broad principle that those in 
power should not force people to do what they have no independent moral obligation 
to do, it would seem that states could never undertake any project that is not morally 
required.32  
 But, in fact, my argument supports no such broad principle.  The principle 
defended is the Cost Principle: those in power should not force people to provide 
humanitarian assistance to those in dire need if the costs exceed that which people 
have a humanitarian obligation to bear.  The argument for the Cost Principle is an 
argument against the imposition of overly burdensome costs.  The argument applies to 
a particular range of cases: those in which one group of people, A, would have an 
obligation to assist another group of people, B, were it not that the costs of assistance 
are too burdensome.   Unlike the broader principle, my argument offers no blanket 
objection to the use of force in the absence of a moral obligation.  When people lack 
an obligation to do something for reasons other than cost, force might still be 
permissible.  
 To see that my argument does not support the broad principle, it is helpful to 
consider such cases in which people lack an obligation for reasons other than cost.  
Consider the following: 
                                                 
32 By “independent moral obligation” I mean a moral obligation that is not a political obligation.  
Henceforth, for the sake of simplicity, I shall drop the various qualifications and use “obligation” 
instead. 
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1.  Perfectionism.  The state taxes one group of people to fund projects (parks, 
theatres, museums etc.) that benefits that same group of people, all things considered. 
2.  Preference Dependent Benefit.  The government proposes taxing one group of 
people to fund some inessential project (e.g. a high-speed rail system) that may 
benefit that same group of people.  Whether or not the project actually benefits them 
depends on people’s preferences.  (If people prefer not to have high-speed rail, high-
speed rail seems unlikely to benefit them).  
3. Superfluous Transfer.  The state taxes one group of people, A, to benefit another 
group of people, B, but in some superfluous way, satisfying no need, right or 
entitlement.  (Suppose, for example, that A is taxed to fund a party in the B 
neighbourhood). 
 These cases are ideal types.  In the real world, mixed cases are likely to arise.  
When, for instance, a state constructs high-speed rail to complement an already 
decent public transport system, arguably what it is doing is benefitting those taxpayers 
who want high-speed rail (as in Preference Dependent Benefit), while forcing those 
taxpayers who do not want it to provide a superfluous benefit to those who do (as in 
Superfluous Transfer). 
 In each of these cases, taxpayers seem to have no pre-existing moral 
obligation to contribute, but not because the costs are overly burdensome.  In 
Perfectionism, the people who stand to benefit are the cost-bearers themselves and it 
is for this reason that they seem to have no obligation to contribute.  If people want to 
refuse a benefit, they seem morally permitted to do so.  The same is true in Preference 
Dependent Benefit but with the added twist that we cannot even know whether the 
project will benefit people without knowing what they want.  In such a case, people 
seem to have no obligation to want one thing rather than another.  In Superfluous 
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Transfer, A has no obligation to benefit B not because of the costs are too high (they 
might be minimal) but because of the superfluous nature of the benefit.  As a number 
of philosophers have argued, there are some kinds of goods that we have no 
obligation to provide for others no matter how low the cost.33 
 In any such cases in which people lack a moral obligation for reasons other 
than cost, the argument for the Cost Principle does not apply.  That argument is 
concerned with defending a certain space within which people can pursue their own 
interests when they are confronted with the high costs of assisting others.  In the three 
cases listed above, no such concern need arise.  In Superfluous Transfer, the costs 
could be minimal.  In Perfectionism, there is no net-cost to speak of; the state’s 
intervention leaves taxpayers better off.  The same is true in Preference Dependent 
Benefit, assuming taxpayers want the good the state offers. 
 It is possible, of course, that the use of taxpayer’s money in these cases is 
objectionable.  Perhaps, as a number of philosophers have argued, states must restrict 
themselves to the enforcement of justice and thus cannot justify spending money on 
anything that taxpayers have no obligation to provide.34  That view is not implausible, 
but it requires further argument to that offered in this article.  As far as this article is 
                                                 
33 Michael Ferry, “Does Morality Demand Our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of 
Duty,” Philosophical Studies 165 (2013): 573-589; Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, “Untying A 
Knot from the inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation,” Social Philosophy and 
Policy 27 (2010): 29-63.  To see that cost is not the issue in such cases it is helpful to consider 
examples where a person engages in supererogatory behaviour at no cost to herself.  To use an example 
from Horgan and Timmons, suppose a person invites a sports-loving neighbour along to a baseball 
game.  The neighbour makes enjoyable company and buys her own ticket.  Or imagine that you can 
help brighten a stranger’s day, as well as your own, by smiling at her as you pass her in the street. 
These are cases where benefiting is costless, yet in neither case does benefitting seem obligatory.  
People who choose not to invite their neighbours to baseball or pass a stranger without smiling do 
nothing wrong.  In short, we are not obliged to satisfy every desire, whim or fancy that other people 
have whenever we can do so at little or no cost to ourselves.  Questions of obligation arise only in 
relation to certain benefits; those satisfying basic needs being a particularly clear example. 
34 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Victor 
Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), pp. 78-83; Justin Weinberg, “Is Government Supererogation Possible?,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011): 263-281 
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concerned, the cases cited above could be cases in which state activity really is 
morally optional.  
 
4. National Self-Defence 
 In the case of wars of national self-defence, a different argument for optional 
war can be made.  This second argument holds that the right to national self-defence 
is, at least sometimes, discretionary: states are entitled to defend themselves but they 
are also entitled not to defend themselves. When this is so, a state that does defend 
itself, wages a war it is not required to wage.35 
 Again, the view appears plausible if we accept an analogy between states and 
individuals.  An individual’s right to self-defence does seem discretionary.  If you are 
unjustly assaulted but, for whatever reason, choose not to defend yourself, then you 
do not act wrongly. 36  It is you, after all, who will suffer the consequences.   
 But again, the analogy fails.  To understand why, we need to explore the 
possible justifications for national self-defence.  When exploring these justifications, 
we should recall our previous finding: states can only justify waging war if they can 
justify the costs assigned to soldiers and taxpayers.  This “permissible assignment of 
costs condition” applies, no matter which justification is given for war.  If the costs 
are overly burdensome, or for whatever other reason cannot be permissibly assigned, 
war is impermissible. 
                                                 
35 As noted above, this argument is much less popular than the argument concerning humanitarian 
intervention.  Indeed, surprisingly little has been written on the idea of optional wars of national self-
defence.  Zohar (“Can a War”, at p. 234) briefly argues against the idea; his reasons are similar to those 
explored below. Walzer is the one scholar who has defended it.  In his treatment of the Winter War 
1939-1940, Walzer claims the Finns were permitted but not required to resist Soviet aggression.  While 
Walzer does not fully explain his position, he seems to be relying on something like the above 
argument. 
36 This, at least, has been the prevalent view in Western philosophy; Rodin, War and Self-Defense, p. 
39. 
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 So what could justify a war of national self-defence?  Three main 
justifications are offered in the literature: 
(1) To defend the rights of individual citizens. 
(2) To defend the norm of non-aggression. 
(3) To defend the national community. 
 These justifications are not mutually exclusive.  It is possible that a war could 
be justified on more than one of these grounds.37  A further possibility, returned to 
below, is that at least some defensive wars cannot be justified at all. 
 Let us explore these justifications in turn, asking the same question of each: 
whether the value the justification refers to is one that the state can permissibly 
choose whether or not to defend.  In the rest of this section, I consider justifications 
(1) and (2).  I will argue that if a war is justified on these grounds, the state is required 
to wage it.  In the next section, I concede that the idea of optional war might be 
vindicated if there were cases in which national self-defence were justified by (3) and 
(3) alone.  However, I will explain why I do not think such cases arise. 
 Let us then consider the idea that national self-defence can be justified to 
defend the rights of individual citizens.  This idea seems plausible since aggression 
violates individual rights.  Which rights are violated depends on the nature of the 
aggressor.  Those we might term “major aggressors” seek to violate our most 
fundamental rights: rights not to be killed, assaulted or subject to some similarly 
grave harm.  Major aggressors will inflict such harm whether or not they are resisted.  
                                                 
37 Walzer presents all three justifications, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 53-63.  Indeed, in places, Walzer 
seems to suggest that states are obligated to wage permissible wars of national self-defence in order to 
uphold the norm of non-aggression (ibid., p. 62) and defend individual rights (“The Moral Standing of 
States: A Response to Four Critics,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 209-229, at p. 211).  This 
makes Walzer’s claim that Finland was morally permitted but not required to wage the Winter War 
surprising.  I am not the first to note Walzer’s vacillation on this issue; see Simon Caney, Justice 
Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 195. 
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“Lesser aggressors”, by contrast, will do so only if they are resisted.  Lesser 
aggressors threaten violence to enhance their power, expand their territory or pursue 
some like objective.38  As long as their victims capitulate, no fundamental rights will 
be violated.  Lesser aggressors might still violate other individual rights, however, 
such as rights to free speech, free association, property, the right not to be displaced 
and the right not to be subject to illegitimate rule.  These rights may not be our most 
fundamental, but they are important and ordinarily demand protection.  There is one 
right, moreover, that all aggressors violate: the right to live in the safety and security 
afforded by the law, free from the threat of unjustified force.  For even if an aggressor 
does not kill or assault anyone, the mere threat to do so is a grave violation of 
people’s safety and security.  Anyone who has been robbed at gunpoint knows this 
only too well.39  
 If a state is permitted to engage in national self-defence to protect the rights of 
its citizens, then it is also required to do so.  Protecting citizens is a core state 
function.  This represents the first point of disanalogy between national self-defence 
and individual self-defence.  It is not a core function of ordinary individuals to protect 
others from attack.  In this respect, a better analogy is with the police.40  If a police 
officer and a group of civilians are attacked by an armed criminal, the police officer 
cannot act as if only her own life is at stake.  She is on duty, and being on duty, she 
                                                 
38 These are the terms used by McMahan, “What Rights,” p. 112.  Other scholars make much the same 
distinction using different terminology.  See for instance Rodin’s distinction between “bloodless 
invasion” and “genocidal aggression”, War and Self-Defense, pp. 131-139. 
39  Gerhard Øverland, “Conditional Threats,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 334-345, at pp. 
335-337; McMahan, “What Rights,” pp. 146-147; Uwe Steinhoff, “Rodin on Self-Defense and the 
“Myth” of National Self-Defense: A Refutation,” Philosophia 41 (2013): 1017-1036, at pp. 1021-1022. 
40 Steinhoff, “Rodin on Self-Defense”, at pp. 1020-1021. 
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must use the defensive force she is permitted to use.  States are like this police officer; 
only states are always on duty.41   
 That states are required to defend their citizens’ rights when defence is 
permissible remains true in democracies.  If a majority votes against resisting an 
aggressor the state could permissibly resist, they effectively allow the rights of other 
citizens to be violated.  These others include both the outvoted minority and those, 
such as children, who cannot vote.  People may be free to allow themselves to be 
killed, enslaved, silenced, robbed, displaced, oppressed or unjustly threatened, but 
they cannot make this decision for others.  Even if a voter is willing to forego state 
protection herself, she should not deny it to others.42 
 That states are required to wage permissible wars in defence of their citizens is 
particularly evident in cases of major aggression.  States should not allow their 
citizens to be killed or assaulted if they can permissibly protect them.43  Matters are 
less clear in cases of lesser aggression only because it is less clear that wars against 
lesser aggressors are permissible.  Perhaps, the rights that lesser aggressors violate are 
insufficiently important to justify killing.  Some philosophers take this view.44  David 
Rodin, for instance, argues that it would be impermissible, in a domestic case, for an 
ordinary individual to kill someone to uphold the rights that lesser aggressors violate.  
                                                 
41 This is not to say that everyone within the state must act like the police.  When the state uses force to 
defend its citizens from aggression, it utilizes the military, much as when the state uses force to defend 
its citizens from crime, it utilizes the police.  In both cases, ordinary citizens need only act in a 
supportive capacity, paying for the police and the military via taxation. The one exception to this is 
when states institute conscription.  It follows from the argument made in previous sections that 
conscription could only be justified if the costs of fighting did not exceed that which ordinary citizens 
are morally obligated to bear.  Even when a state is wrong to conscript, however, it could still be 
required to wage war to defend its citizens using a professional military.  Again, the state’s duty to 
provide its citizens with police protection provides a useful analogy; see Section 3 above. 
42 Zohar, “Can a War”, at p. 234. 
43 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 69.  Walzer contrasts Nazi aggression, which he thinks states had a 
duty to resist, with Soviet aggression against Finland.  It is clearly because Walzer views the Soviet 
attack as lesser aggression that he regards Finnish resistance as optional.   
44 Rodin, War and Self-Defense; David Rodin, “The Myth of National Self-Defence,” in The Morality 
of Defensive War, ed. Cecile Fabre and Seth Lazar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Norman, 
Ethics, Killing and War ch. 4. 
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The paradigm case of justified self-defence, he argues, is in response to a physical 
attack.  Beyond this paradigm, Rodin is willing to accept that killing could be 
permitted to avoid enslavement or life-long unjust imprisonment, but not violations of 
lesser freedoms.45  
 Rodin’s challenge presents us with three possibilities: (a) Rodin is right and 
wars against lesser aggressors are simply unjustified, (b) Rodin is wrong and wars 
against lesser aggressors can be justified to defend individual rights, (c) wars against 
lesser aggressors can be justified but on some other grounds besides individual rights.   
I shall explore (c) in the rest of the article.  Let me here consider (a) and (b).  In either 
case, the idea of optional war fails.  Consider (a) first.  We have already established 
that states must wage all permissible wars against major aggressors.  If all permissible 
wars against major aggressors are required and all wars against lesser aggressors 
impermissible, then wars of national self-defence are either required or impermissible.  
If we accept Rodin’s view regarding lesser aggression, we can straightforwardly 
dismiss the possibility of optional wars of national self-defence. 
 There is reason however to think that Rodin is wrong and that at least some 
wars against lesser aggressors can be justified in defence of individual rights. Rodin’s 
claims concerning ordinary citizens are misleading in at least two respects.  First, 
even ordinary individuals seem permitted to kill in other cases besides the narrow 
range Rodin acknowledges.  As Helen Frowe has persuasively argued, people who are 
subject to the tyrannical rule of another, even if they are not actually enslaved, may be 
permitted to use lethal force if necessary to escape.46  The same seems true of people 
unjustly imprisoned for many years, even if they are due for eventual release.  This 
                                                 
45 Rodin, War and Self-Defense, p. 48. 
46 Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 140-141. 
  25 
point is important since many lesser aggressors are tyrants who imprison dissenters 
and deny everyone basic liberties.  Indeed, lesser aggressors who seek to rule the 
countries they attack often have to resort to tyranny to maintain control.47 
 Second, moreover, we have found that ordinary individuals are not the best 
analogy for states.  A better analogy is the police.  Crucially then, the police can be 
permitted to use lethal force against armed criminals who only threaten others with 
serious harm.  The police do not need to wait until the criminals have actually 
attempted to kill anyone.  The fact that they are armed and refusing to lower their 
weapons can be sufficient.48  One way to regard lesser aggressors is as a type of 
armed criminal: they break international law, threaten people with weapons and 
violate people’s rights.  If the police can shoot ordinary criminals who refuse to lower 
their weapons, the military seem permitted to shoot lesser aggressors who act 
likewise.49   
 There is then good reason to adopt position (b): to think, pace Rodin, that wars 
against lesser aggressors can be justified in defence of individual rights.  Yet if a war 
against a lesser aggressor can be justified on this basis, then it must be waged.  For as 
we have seen, states are obliged to defend the rights of their citizens whenever they 
are permitted to do so. 
                                                 
47 Ibid., pp. 143-145. 
48 Steinhoff, “Rodin on Self-Defense”, at p. 1021. 
49 Rodin considers this analogy between war and law enforcement, although he chooses to focus on law 
enforcement as punishment rather than (as in the above example) crime prevention (Rodin, War and 
Self-Defense, pp. 173-179). Rodin concedes that war could be justified as law enforcement were there 
an international authority capable of dispensing punishment impartially, but he argues that no such 
authority exists.  I do not have space to properly respond to this argument here except to note, 
following Jacob Blair, that even if there were a strict impartiality condition for punishment, there is no 
reason to assume that this condition applies to crime prevention.  This is important since crime 
prevention offers a better analogy for wars of national self-defence than punishment.  Jacob Blair, 
“Tensions in a Certain Conception of Just War as Law Enforcement,” Res Publica 14 (2008): 303-311, 
at pp. 309-311. 
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 Let us turn to the second suggested justification for defensive wars: upholding 
the norm of non-aggression.  Philosophers who make this argument urge us to 
consider the wider implications of particular conflicts.  Successful aggression in one 
instance can encourage aggression at other times and places.  If the norm of non-
aggression is to survive, it must be upheld.50   Walzer makes the point as follows: 
Aggression challenges [international society] directly and is much more dangerous than domestic 
crime, because there are no policemen.  But that only means that the “citizens” of international society 
must rely on themselves and on one another.  Police powers are distributed among all the members…  
The rights of the member states must be vindicated, for it is only by virtue of those rights that there is a 
society at all.  If they cannot be upheld (at least sometimes), international society collapses into a state 
of war or is transformed into a universal tyranny.
51
 
 Note the suggestion of a further point of disanalogy between states and 
ordinary individuals and a further point of analogy between states and the police.  The 
point of disanalogy with individuals is that while individuals can call upon the police 
to uphold the law and maintain security, states have no international police upon 
which to call.  The point of analogy with the police is that, since there are no 
international police, states must assume the relevant police powers themselves.  
 Suppose that Walzer is right that upholding the norm of non-aggression can at 
least sometimes justify war.  If so, would war also be morally required?  Yes, for 
reasons similar to those explored above.  War would not be permissible unless 
something of significant moral importance was at stake.  What is at stake here is the 
defence of people’s rights.  The world that Walzer warns us of – one characterised by 
a “state of war” or “universal tyranny” - is a world in which people’s fundamental 
                                                 
50 A. J. Coates, The Ethics of War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 127; McMahan, “What 
Rights,” pp. 149-150; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 58-59. 
51 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 59. 
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rights to life and liberty are routinely violated.52  States seem required to protect these 
rights, whenever they are permitted to do so. 
 One key concern must be to protect the rights of the state’s own citizens.  A 
global state of war or universal tyranny is a threat to them as well as everyone else.  
To this extent, the justification for defensive war based on upholding the norm of non-
aggression can be seen as an extension of the previous justification from the defence 
of the rights of individual citizens.  But a further legitimate concern is the defence of 
the rights of foreigners.  That a state can be obliged to wage war to defend the rights 
of foreigners is familiar from the case of humanitarian intervention.  If it is possible 
for states to be obliged to intervene to protect foreigners from a domestic threat, it 
also seems plausible that states can be obliged to uphold the norm of non-aggression 
to protect foreigners from external threats. 
 This is not to say that soldiers and taxpayers can be obliged to bear any cost to 
uphold the norm of non-intervention.  As with humanitarian intervention, there must 
be a limit to the costs that cost bearers are obliged to bear.  When the costs exceed 
that limit, states should not wage war to uphold the norm of non-aggression.  When 
the costs fall below that limit, however, wars justified on this basis are also required.  
Upholding the norm of non-aggression is not then a case of Superfluous Transfer, 
where the benefit in question is of such a superfluous nature that no one has any 
obligation to provide it no matter how low the cost.  People’s rights are at stake; rights 
so important it is permissible to kill in their defence.  As long as the costs fall within 
an acceptable range, states are obliged to act. 
                                                 
52 Walzer would want to add that the rights of national communities is also at stake but, for reasons that 
will become clear in the next section, I doubt whether such rights can justify war.  
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 There may still be an issue of fairness to be addressed.  The norm of non-
aggression is a global public good.  The costs should be fairly distributed.  It may be 
that states that are not attacked have an obligation to aid those that are attacked.  But 
as with other global public goods, such as the fight against international organised 
crime or efforts to prevent climate change, a state is still required to take action even 
if others fail to do their fair share.  Indeed, the fact that other states have shirked their 
responsibilities may actually oblige a state to do more.53 
 Let us sum up this section by noting what is perhaps the most important point 
of disanalogy between national self-defence and individual self-defence.  What 
justifies an individual’s resort to self-defence is the protection of something that is her 
own: her life, her liberty or her person.  This is why the right to individual self-
defence seems discretionary.  But the above two justifications for national self-
defence both refer to something that does not belong to the state.  A state that fails to 
defend individual rights or uphold the norm of non-aggression, when it is justified in 
doing so, cannot justify this failure as merely allowing the violation of its own rights.  
This is not the case. 
 
5. Defending the National Community 
 But are there not occasions in which the state could be said to be only 
defending itself?  Here we come to our third suggested justification: the defence of 
the state as a national community.  Those that endorse this justification argue that 
states represent communities of great importance to their members.  Within states, 
people can pursue a “common life”: expressing their identity through their language 
                                                 
53 Garrett Cullity, The Moral Demands of Affluence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 73-77; 
Sabine Hohl and Dominic Roser, “Stepping in for the Polluters?  Climate Justice under Partial 
Compliance,” Analyse & Kritik 33 (2011): 477-500. 
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and cultural practices, and associating together to determine their own affairs.54  But 
for states to function as genuine communities, it is argued, they must be protected 
from outside interference.  Aggressors that would violate the political independence 
and territorial integrity of a state would disrupt or destroy the common life of its 
citizens.55 
 If states have rights as national communities, how should these rights be 
understood?  Someone might claim that these rights are reducible to individual rights.  
On that view, talk of the rights of national communities is merely shorthand for the 
combined rights of their individual members to live in one place and associate freely 
together. 56   But this is not how the rights of national communities are usually 
understood.  More often, they are conceived of as collective rights held by the 
citizenry as a whole.  On this second view, no French person has a right that France 
exists but the French people as a whole have such a right.57  Adopting this second 
view, one can see how a final argument for optional war may be derived.  If citizens 
have a collective right to their national community, then they can decide, via state 
institutions, whether or not it is defended.  Thus whenever the sole justification for 
war is the defence of the national community, the war is permitted but not required. 
                                                 
54 The term “common life” is Walzer’s, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 54. 
55  Christopher Kutz, “Democracy, Defence, and the Threat of Intervention,” in The Morality of 
Defensive War, ed. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Margaret 
Moore, “Collective Self-Determination, Institutions of Justice, and Wars of National Defence,” in The 
Morality of Defensive War, ed. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); 
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: 
Basic Books, 2006), esp. pp. 63-69; Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States”. 
56 Cécile Fabre, “Cosmopolitanism and Wars of Self-Defence,” in The Morality of Defensive War, ed. 
Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 95.  If such an individualist 
account is adopted, the community argument for optional war fails at the outset. 
57 For a collective account of rights of this sort see the Kutz, Moore and Walzer references (footnote 
50) and Avishair Margalit and Joseph Raz, “National Self-determination,” The Journal of Philosophy 
87 (1990): 439-461; Anna Stilz, “Territorial Rights and National Defence,” in The Morality of 
Defensive War, ed. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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 Let us call this argument for optional war the “community argument”.  Of all 
the arguments, it seems to me the most plausible.  The thought that states have rights 
as communities and can wage war on this basis is widely held.  The idea that those 
rights are collective rights is not implausible.  If then there were wars whose sole 
justification was the defence of the national community, those wars might well be 
optional.   Nevertheless, I think this argument too is mistaken.  In order to explain 
why, let me make three preliminary points. 
 First, it is worth emphasising that the argument depends on the existence of 
cases in which the community justification is the sole justification for war.  Cases in 
which war can also be justified in defence of individual rights or the norm of non-
aggression are no use.  We have seen that when states are justified in waging war on 
these grounds, they are also required to do so.  Adding a further justification – the 
defence of the national community – does not negate this requirement.  Again, an 
analogy with the police proves helpful.  If a criminal attacks a police officer and a 
group of civilians, the police officer is not only justified, but also required, to use 
(necessary and proportionate) force to protect the civilians and uphold the law.  It is 
true that the police officer is also justified in using force to defend herself, but this 
further justification does not negate her duty to use force.  It is only in cases in which 
self-defence is her sole justification for using force – as presumably it would be were 
she alone and off duty – that defence is optional.   
 Second, not all aggressors are alike.  Some are worse than others.  We have 
seen this in relation to individual rights; the same is true when considering the effects 
of aggression upon communities.  Some aggressors would completely destroy the 
national communities of the states they target.  They would commit genocide or 
impose such tyrannical rule that people would be left unable to express their identity 
  31 
or associate freely to maintain communal bonds.  But other aggressors pose little 
threat.  A state that invades another to impose a stable democracy, for instance, might 
be guilty of aggression but does not destroy the community the state represents.  Or 
imagine a case in which an aggressor annexes an uninhabited stretch of its 
neighbour’s territory.  Such aggression does little to disrupt the common life of the 
target state, whose citizens can continue their lives much as before. 
 Third, it is not easy to destroy a national community.  We can see this from 
the history of minority nationalism.  As Will Kymlicka has documented, the 
consensus amongst great thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries, from Condorcet to 
Mill, was that minority nations would soon disappear.  The Irish, Catalans, Poles and 
other such populations would abandon their identities for those of the more 
“advanced” nations that ruled their territories.  This did not happen, not for any lack 
of violence and oppression, but because people seem able to maintain their cultural 
practices and associative bonds even in the face of violence and oppression.58  The 
same lesson is discernable from more recent examples such as East Timor, Kurdistan 
and Tibet.59 
 With these points in mind, let me explain why I reject the community 
argument for optional war.  The argument depends on the existence of cases in which 
the defence of the national community is the sole justification for war.  Yet, for two 
reasons it seems doubtful that such cases exist.  First, the community-based 
justification seems, if anything, less plausible than justifications based on individual 
rights or the norm of non-aggression.  If states were permitted to wage war to defend 
themselves as communities, one would expect that other forms of community would 
                                                 
58 Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 203-207. 
59 As these examples indicate, and as proponents of the community justification for war accept (see, for 
instance, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 91-95), national communities can exist without state 
representation.  I return to this point below. 
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have some similar privilege.  After all, states are not the only type of community that 
is of great importance to its members; there are also various sub-national 
communities, including businesses, civic organisations, religious groups, trade unions 
and regional areas (neighbourhoods, cities, counties etc.).  Yet these sub-national 
communities do not have a right to defend their independence by violent means.60  If 
one business attempts a hostile takeover of another, the latter business has no right to 
react with violence. 61   Similarly, when the UK counties of Montgomeryshire, 
Radnorshire and Breconshire were forcibly merged by the national government in 
1974, all three had a right to complain, but none to violently resist.  The lack of an 
example in which the defence of a sub-national community can justify armed 
resistance lends us reason to doubt whether the defence of the national community 
can justify war.62   
 This is not to deny that states differ from sub-national communities in various 
ways.  States exercise coercive power over their members, a fact that may enhance the 
importance of living within a state with which one identifies.  Subnational 
communities, however, are voluntary and tend to be much smaller in size.  As such, 
they are able to serve essential interests in autonomy and intimacy in ways that states 
cannot.  As Rodin has noted, “[b]oth forms of community are clearly important, 
although in very different ways.”  While these difference are worth reflecting upon, 
“there is nothing to suggest that the survival of one form of community should be 
                                                 
60 McMahan, “What Rights,” pp. 129-130; Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, pp. 139-146; Rodin, War 
and Self-Defense, pp. 158-162; Rodin, “The Myth of National Self-Defence,” pp. 64-74. 
61 Rodin, “The Myth of National Self-Defence,” pp. 64-74. 
62 Note that this argument does not deny that sub-national communities may, at times, be permitted to 
use violence to defend individual rights or uphold the law. The point is merely that they are not 
permitted to use violence to defend their status as distinct communities; ibid., p. 77. 
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accorded near infinite value, whereas the survival of the other next to none in 
determining permissible defensive action”.63 
 Contrast this with justifications for war based on individual rights and the 
norm of non-aggression.  As we have seen, these justifications do have a domestic 
equivalent.  The police can be justified in using force to defend individual rights and 
uphold the law.  The existence of this example in which the defence of individual 
rights and the law can sometimes justify force in the domestic setting lends us reason 
to think that like considerations can sometimes justify force in the international 
setting.64   
  We have then reason to doubt whether defending the national community can 
ever justify war.  But even if we leave this problem aside and assume that the 
justification sometimes applies, we still face the task of finding a case in which war is 
justified on this basis alone.  Here we come to the second reason to doubt the 
community argument: those cases in which it seems most plausible that war could be 
justified to defend a national community are cases in which it seems no less plausible 
that war is justified on grounds of defending individual rights.  Consider, for instance, 
cases in which an aggressor seeks to entirely destroy the national community.  If there 
were a case in which the community justification succeeds, it would be case of this 
sort.  Yet it is hard to see how an aggressor could entirely destroy a community unless 
it was prepared to perpetrate severe violations of individual rights.  The mere denial 
                                                 
63 Ibid., p. 76. 
64 For war to be justified in any particular case, all relevant just war conditions must be fulfilled 
including proportionality, last resort, reasonable chance of success and the permissible assignment of 
costs condition.  The same conditions apply to the police.  The police should not order their officers to 
use force if doing so is disproportionate, unnecessary, ineffective or imposes overly burdensome costs 
on the police officers involved or the taxpayers who fund their work.  My point then is not that war is 
justified whenever it stands to defend individual rights or uphold the norm of non-aggression, but that 
the example of the police suggests that justifying war on these grounds is a genuine possibility.  This 
contrasts with the attempt to justify war as a defence of the national community where our judgements 
regarding subnational communities suggests that violence could never be justified on this basis. 
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of sovereignty is not sufficient.  As a number of philosophers have noted, and as 
examples such as Scotland and Quebec indicate, national communities can exist, and 
even flourish, without statehood.65  Were an aggressor to permit citizens their basic 
rights, they would remain free to express their national identity and establish national 
(and nationalist) associations to maintain communal bonds. An aggressor might be 
able to entirely destroy a community were it prepared to impose tyrannical 
constraints.  But as we saw in the last section, there seems strong reason to believe 
that the defence of individual rights can itself justify resisting an aggressor of this 
kind. 
 Conversely, the cases in which it is hardest to justify war on individual rights 
grounds are cases in which it is no less hard to justify war on grounds of defending 
the state as a community.  Consider, for instance, the cases referred to above in which 
the aggressor seeks to institute democracy or annex uninhabited territory.  Some 
theorists (such as Rodin) would deny that individual rights could justify war in these 
cases; the rights violations involved are, for them, too minor.  But then (as Rodin 
would also grant) these are cases in which it seems no less hard to justify war on 
community grounds, given the limited impact of such aggression upon the common 
life of the target state.  
 Might there not be in-between cases: those in which an aggressor seeks to 
destroy a national community, not by tyranny, but by changing various incentives and 
institutional practices?  Suppose, for instance, that upon victory an aggressor were to 
attempt to bribe people into adopting the aggressor’s national identity with material 
rewards.  We might also imagine an aggressor instituting coercive measures that stop 
                                                 
65 See Allen E. Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania 
and Quebec, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 48-65; McMahan, “What Rights,” pp. 135-136; 
Helder de Schutter, “Nations Beyond Nationalism,” Inquiry 50 (2007): 378-394. 
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short of tyranny: for instance a law that bans the use of the native language in state 
schools and public administration but not in society at large.   
 The problem with this suggestion is that such an aggressor would leave the 
native population with plenty of opportunities to preserve their community through 
non-violent means (by refusing the bribes, speaking their own language at home, 
creating their own schools etc.).  In the real world, it is almost certain that the native 
population would pursue these opportunities.  As we have noted, national 
communities are not easily destroyed.  People tend to remain loyal to their national 
culture and identity even under significant pressure to defect.  If tyrannical rule could 
not destroy the sense of a distinctive national community in post-war Catalonia or 
occupied East Timor, it is hard to see how milder measures could work.  But even if 
we imagine a hypothetical case in which the native population failed to pursue these 
opportunities, it is still hard to see how war could be justified on community grounds.  
War involves killing.  It seems implausible that a state could justify killing in order to 
defend the existence of a distinct national community when the members of that 
community could preserve it through non-violent means were they motivated to do so.  
It is one thing to kill to prevent the forcible destruction of a community, it is quite 
another to kill in order to forestall a situation in which one’s citizens acquiesce to its 
disbandment.66 
 To summarise: when it comes to the community argument for optional war 
there are two possibilities.  The first is that states are never justified in waging war to 
defend the national communities they represent, since other forms of community lack 
this privilege.  The second is that there are some cases in which war can be justified 
                                                 
66 Of course, it remains unjust for aggressors to attempt to destroy a community even if it is by means 
that permit its members’ opportunities to preserve their community.  But the question we are asking 
here is not whether the aggressor’s conduct is just but whether defence of the national community 
offers a uniquely plausible justification for war.  In this case, as in the above cases, this is not so. 
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on community grounds, but these are extreme cases (e.g. tyranny or genocide) in 
which other justifications for war seem no less plausible.  Without an example in 
which the sole justification for war is the defence of the national community, this last 
argument for optional war – which had seemed the most promising – also fails.    
 
6. Conclusion 
 States are required to wage the wars they are permitted to wage.  We have 
come to this conclusion after assessing two arguments for optional war.  The most 
popular of these arguments, that wars of humanitarian intervention are sometimes 
optional on account of their cost, failed since considerations of cost can only render 
war impermissible, not optional.  The second argument, that a state’s right to engage 
in national self-defence is discretionary, might have succeeded were there cases in 
which the sole justification for war was the defence of the national community, but 
the article found strong reason to doubt that such cases arise. 
 Two final points are worth making.  First, lets us return to the domestic 
analogy.  We have noted various points of disanalogy.  Individuals might bear the 
costs of their own humanitarian interventions, but states assign these costs to soldiers 
and taxpayers.  It is not the core function of ordinary individuals to defend others 
from attack; it is for states.  Individuals can call upon the police to enforce the law; 
states must do so themselves.  These points are crucial when considering the idea of 
optional war, but I have not claimed that all analogies between international affairs 
and domestic affairs should be rejected.  In fact, as the reader will have noted, I have 
employed certain analogies myself.  What is important is that the analogies we 
employ succeed in comparing like with like.  Often a better analogy, than that 
between the state and ordinary individuals, is between the state and its agents (such as 
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the military) at the international level and the state and its agents (such as the police) 
at the domestic level.  Thus we saw that a better analogy for the state imposed costs of 
humanitarian intervention than the self-imposed costs of a Good Samaritan are the 
state imposed costs of Good Samaritan laws.  Similarly, we saw that a better analogy 
for resistance to aggression than individual self-defence is police protection from 
crime. The best analogy for the state in a domestic example is often the state itself.   
 Second, it is interesting to consider the implications of our findings for public 
debates regarding war.  At first glance, it might seem that the denial of optional wars 
renders debate unnecessary.  In a world without optional wars, morality always 
provides a determinate answer as to whether or not a war should be waged.  Once 
people have that answer, there is nothing more to discuss.  But, in fact, the denial of 
optional war still leaves plenty of room for debate.  While morality is determinate, it 
is not transparent.  Ascertaining whether a war is morally required or prohibited is 
difficult.  It involves complicated normative and empirical judgements on such 
matters as the war’s likely consequences, the justice of its cause, the feasibility of 
peaceful alternatives and the level of cost to which cost-bearers can permissibly be 
subjected.  While governments and voters must make these judgements as best they 
can, disagreement is almost inevitable. 
 Nor should the denial of optional war radically change the nature of public 
debate.  A belief in optional war may be widespread but it tends not to be invoked in 
arguments for or against particular wars.   Instead, when states consider waging war, 
public debate focuses on precisely those factors that go into determining a war’s 
deontic status: the war’s likely consequences, the justice of its cause, etc.  It is rare for 
a supporter and opponent of a war to agree that a war is morally permissible and 
disagree only over whether the state should exercise the ‘option’ of waging it.  Almost 
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invariably, what divides supporters and opponents of a war is disagreement over the 
permissibility of waging it.  
 Where the denial of optional war is important is in demonstrating just how 
much is at stake.  Without optional wars there is no buffer zone between the morally 
required and the morally prohibited.  If decision makers fail to wage a permissible 
war, they fail to fulfil a moral requirement.  If they wage a war that is not required, 
they wage a war that is impermissible.  Far from rendering public debate unnecessary, 
the denial of optional war shows just how important it is that these matters are the 
subject of extensive deliberation.  A war is either impermissible or required and we 
had better get it right. 
 
 
